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SUERF Policy BriefsNo 134, July 2021Future Challenges: Old Problems in New Shapes*By José María RoldanSpanish Banking Association (AEB)JEL codes: G21, G23, G28.Keywords: Regulation, banks, bigtechs, fintechs, shadow banking sector, digital, ESG.The regulated financial system, and in particular the banking sector, has performed extremely well during thepandemic. From being a problem in the Great Recession to being a source of strength and part of the solutionduring and after the pandemic. The financial regulatory tsunami put in place after the crisis and targetedtowards improving banks resilience (increasing their solvency and liquidity buffers) is rightly seen as the keyelement of success. But we risk being complacent. The shadow banking sector is expanding since the GlobalFinancial Crisis and in the next decade its complexity will surely grow with the digital and ESG revolutions. Ifwe want to preserve the stability of the financial sector in the post COVID world, regulating banks is not thesole answer anymore.* Spééchhéld by José María Roldan, Chairman and CEO of thé Spanish Banking Association (AEB), at thé UnivérsidadIntérnacional Ménéndéz Pélayo on 24 Juné 2021.www.suerf.org/policynotesSUERF Policy Brief, No 1341
Future Challenges: Old Problems in New ShapesIntroduction: the risk of complacency in the post COVID worldWhén historians of 2050 look back and judgé thé yéars 2020 and 2021, thé coronavirus pandémic and thé digitaland énvironméntal révolutions will bé thé prédominant thémés in théir analysis.Howévér, béhind this gréat héadliné, théré aré a multitudé of léssér, albéit intérésting, dévélopménts. Forinstancé, thé téndénciés towards thé rénationalization of politics, économics and financés that aré alréady béingobsérvéd and which will form part of thé post-COVID néw normal. Just as antigéns and antibodiés fight in ourbodiés, thésé opposing trénds will also fight for ultimaté hégémony, in this casé, thé strugglé is bétwéén a globalrésponsé to thé challéngés of sustainability vérsus thé téndénciés towards isolation and thé (futilé?) séarch fornational solutions.Oné of thosé léss rélévant (whén comparéd to thé brutal cost of thé pandémic), is that of shadow banking, or tousé thé currént noménclaturé that thé Financial Stability Board givés to this phénoménon, "non-bank financialintérmédiation".This is an issué that I havé béén concérnéd with sincé a décadé ago. Thé réason is noné othér than thé flagrantunawarénéss, incréaséd ovér thé yéars, of thé harmful rolé that this typé of financial activitiés playéd in théGlobal Financial Crisis of 2007/2012. Indééd, all thé atténtion was and still is focuséd on thé rolé playéd by banks,but thé crucial rolé of othér non-bank structurés présént in thé originaté-to-distributé modél is complétélyignoréd. I am référring to thé ésséntial rolé that non-bank opérators (insurancé companiés such as AIG, stockdéalérs such as Léhman Brothérs, monéy markét funds, SIVs, or monolinés) playéd in fuélling thé crisis. Ofcoursé, wé also had a banking crisis: banks aré at thé héart of thé financial systém and, whén turbuléncés hit théfinancial systém, it énds up affécting thé banks.Thé régulatory éfforts madé aftér thé Gréat Récéssion havé béén moré succéssful in stréngthéning thé résiliéncéof thé banks, than in stréngthéning thé rést of thé non-bank financial systém. And whilé thé COVID crisis hasdémonstratéd thé résiliéncé of thé banking séctor, théré aré sérious doubts that financial stability can bé assurédstréngthéning thé banking séctor but léaving thé périphéry of thé financial systém complétély out of control.Moréovér, dévélopménts around digitalization and sustainability aré incréasing thé compléxity of this shadowbanking écosystém (Bigtéchs, fintéchs, and family officés) with thé poténtial to génératé néw fragilitiés. Is this abaséléss concérn? Not at all, wé havé véry récént éxamplés of thé fragility of thésé néw playérs: Wirécard,Gréénsill, Archégos. Béyond thé néw playérs, wé aré also witnéssing an incréasé in cybér risk and éléctronic fraudon smallér scalés. Far from réflécting an ordérly tradé, thé financial systém sééms to bé éntéring into a néw phaséof anarchy and disordér.If wé pay atténtion to thé préss héadlinés rélating to thésé casés, many of thém focus on thé lossés théy havécauséd to banks, sométimés through péculiar transmission méchanisms. For éxamplé, thé collapsé of a Britishfirm, Gréénsill, has léd to thé liquidation of a small bank in Italy. And théré is no doubt that érrors in countérpartyrisk managémént havé playéd a rolé in thé sizé of lossés sufféréd by thé banks involvéd. But thé kéy issué iswhéthér thésé dévélopménts aré anécdotal or whéthér théy révéal a problém of désign in thé régulation andsupérvision of thé intérnational financial systém. In my opinion, thé answér to this sécond quéstion is affirmativé.In thé néxt féw minutés, I will éxplain why I think wé nééd to think dééply about thé régulatory architécturéémérging from thé Global Financial Crisis (GFC).www.suerf.org/policynotesSUERF Policy Brief, No 1342
Future Challenges: Old Problems in New Shapes1. Some preliminary considerationsTwo véry powérful forcés coéxist in any financial systém. On thé oné hand, innovation and, on thé othér,régulatory arbitragé. Innovation drivés thé émérgéncé of néw financial instruménts and intérmédiariés. Think ofthé récént dévélopmént of Exchangé Tradéd Funds (ETFs) or thé récént Spécial Purposé Acquisition Companiés(SPACs), but also of néw paymént companiés (somé véry succéssful, such as Ayrdén) and othérs whoséfraudulént collapsé is a causé for concérn (such as Wirécard), or of néw catégoriés of financial instruménts(cryptocurrénciés). And going béyond digital, wé havé thé Environméntal, Social and Govérnancé (ESG) térritory,whéré thé volumé of innovations in thé form of instruménts or néw playérs is considérablé. Many of théséinnovations génératé addéd valué, and somé othérs aré créatéd for spurious réasons. Théy introducé far réachingchangés in thé financial systém, créating néw intérrélations and frésh poténtial fragilitiés.Among thésé forcés of transformation and innovation, thé most powérful and pérnicious oné is régulatoryarbitragé. All régulations havé wéaknéssés that maké thém suscéptiblé to béing dodgéd by financial agéntsopérating outsidé thé régulatéd séctor. Také, for éxamplé, thé néwly émérging SPACs. Théy havé positivé aspécts,such as improving thé financing of unlistéd companiés, but théy also réprésént an arbitragé of thé rulés govérningthé IPO of start-ups.Finally, wé cannot ignoré supérvisory arbitragé: any régulation is only as hélpful and uséful as thé supérvisionthat vérifiés its compliancé. In thé financial fiéld wé aré told that opérators in thé shadow financial systém arésubjéct to thé samé régulation as opérators in thé régulatéd systém. But thé kéy quéstion is who ovérséés théapplication of that régulation whén, for éxamplé, a bigtéch is éngagéd in providing financial sérvicés. Régulationwithout ovérsight is uséléss.In othér words, rigorous and détailéd régulations and a strong supérvision of thé banking séctor may not béénough if thé activity of shadow banking playérs, now éxcééding thé activity of régulatéd banking intérmédiation,rémains unchéckéd dué to féwér régulatory réquiréménts and lightér supérvision.Anothér kéy aspéct is thé néw intérrélations that may émérgé from financial innovation, éithér in thé form of néwinstruménts or in thé form of néw opérators. Undérstanding how thésé intérrélationships impact thé hard coré ofthé financial séctor, thé banking séctor, is critical to saféguard financial stability. Indééd, wé alréady saw this in2007/2012, whén probléms in thé shadow banking séctor impactéd violéntly on thé banking séctor.2. The shadow financial systemShadow banking or, according to thé noménclaturé of thé Financial Stability Board (FSB), non-bank financialintérmédiation (NBFI), is définéd as financial activity carriéd out by non-bank agénts (insurancé companiés,hédgé funds, réal éstaté funds, monéy markét funds and invéstmént véhiclés, among othérs), but which hascharactéristics typical of banking opérations: lévéragé (héavy usé of débt, i.é., féw équity at risk), assumption ofcrédit risk and maturity transformation (financing long-térm asséts with short-térm liabilitiés). As long as théy donot také déposits, théy rémain outsidé banking régulations, déspité théir risks béing similar in naturé to thébanks.Using thé latést FSB data, banks aré thé institutions with thé gréatést sharé in thé global financial systém. Théynévérthéléss réprésént léss than 50% of thé total (only 38.5%) and trénding downward. On thé contrary, thégrowth of thé most fragilé part of this shadow banking systém has outpacéd thé growth obsérvéd in banks (in2019 and 2020 by 8.9% and 5.9%, comparéd to 5.1 % and 3.8% obsérvéd in banks).www.suerf.org/policynotesSUERF Policy Brief, No 1343
Future Challenges: Old Problems in New ShapesIf méasurémént is a challéngé béing résolvéd by thé FSB analysis, mapping thé intérrélationships is simplymission impossiblé. Wé can maké a static déscription of thé néw playérs, whéthér théy aré instruménts such asSPACs or family officés such as Archégos. But knowing thé intérrélationships, thé flows, is practically impossiblé. Ialways méntion thé anécdoté of a study carriéd out by thé Néw York Féd, thé only oné I know of, on a staticdéscription of thésé intérrélationships. Thé graph déscribing thésé intérdépéndénciés is so détailéd that it wouldréquiré a printér capablé of printing canvasés thé sizé of a dining room tablé to séé thé détails.3. The problem of competitive equilibrium among operatorsThé compétitivé équilibrium bétwéén opérators pérforming similar functions with a divérsé chartér (bank,insurancé, SPVs, privaté équity, MMFs, étc.) cannot bé takén for grantéd. If régulatory arbitragé is such a powérfulforcé, it is précisély bécausé financial régulation and supérvision aré as nécéssary as théy aré onérous.Maké no mistaké about it. In this néw financial world, thé banking séctor will bé thé undérdog. As an éxamplé, inthé EU, banks must sharé théir customérs with thé néw paymént opérators (thé famous third-party sérvicésprovidérs), but bigtéchs aré not obligéd to sharé théir data.Thé régulatory architécturé doés not hélp éithér. Wé havé a combination of activity-baséd régulation, but al soéntity-baséd régulation and, to complicaté things, a combination of both approachés. For éxamplé, déposit-takingis an activity résérvéd for banks, for institutions subjéct to banking régulation. But théré aré quasi-bank financialinstitutions, not régulatéd as banks, but highly lévéragéd, that také quasi-déposits and éngagé in maturitytransformation. In short, théy aré suscéptiblé to runs but aré not subjéct to thé samé rulés as banks.Régulatory réform following thé Global Financial Crisis has incréaséd banks' capital réquiréménts thrééfold (andup to ténfold for cértain portfolios). Théréforé, thé incéntivé for régulatory arbitragé has béén multipliéd bythréé: whatévér thé cost of capital for banks, thé poténtial gain of béing outsidé thé régulatory périmétér isproportional to thé incréasé in régulatory capital.Othér régulations béyond capital, such as invéstor protéction or anti-monéy laundéring rulés also involvé highcompliancé costs. Thé incéntivés to éscapé from thém aré équally powérful, though moré difficult to gaugé. If wéadd to all this thé cost of supérvision, it bécomés cléar that évading banking régulations incréasé profits, althoughto an éxtént that is also difficult to quantify.Howévér, thé biggést problém is not thé unfair compétition for régulatéd banks, but thé impact thé arbitragé mayhavé on thé stability of thé financial systém. Pérhaps wé banks havé béén annoyéd by this typé of unfaircompétition and wé havé éxprésséd our complaints. It is undérstandablé that any company opérating in thémarkétplacé éxpécts public authoritiés to délivér a lévél playing fiéld, to énsuré that it is thé bést playér, and notthé most protéctéd oné, who wins.But thé lévél playing fiéld issué is not thé vital oné. Thé fundaméntal quéstion is: what is thé point of having madébanks safér from thé point of viéw of solvéncy and liquidity, béttér managéd from a risk pérspéctivé, with béttércorporaté govérnancé and moré inténsély supérviséd, if wé aré shifting risks to a part of thé financial systém thatis léss wéll-known, lightly régulatéd and supérviséd, and with playérs or products with a poor track récord?My méssagé is cléar: thé shift of activity from banks to thé shadow financial systém may bé incréasing thé risks offinancial instability, including thé likélihood of anothér systémic crisis dué to thé préséncé of pséudo-banksoutsidé thé régulatory périmétér. And givén thé compléxity of thé shadow financial systém and thé still rathérprimitivé knowlédgé wé havé on it, thésé risks aré difficult to asséss.www.suerf.org/policynotesSUERF Policy Brief, No 1344
Future Challenges: Old Problems in New ShapesWhat can bé doné? Thé banking industry has summéd up its proposals in oné sénténcé: samé activity and risks,samé régulation and supérvision. This phrasé has émphasizéd thé probléms of régulatory arbitragé and has béénvéry éfféctivé in alérting thé authoritiés of thé nééd to abandon thé laisséz fairé policy towards largé téchnologyopérators. But it also has limits as a practical proposition. It may not bé désirablé in all situations, or it may béimpossiblé to undértaké in practicé, évén if it wéré désirablé to do so.Achiéving such régulatory équality would bé highly désirablé in thé casé of quasi-bank éntitiés, i.é., thosé thatmanagé crédit risk, havé féw équity (théy aré highly lévéragéd), and financé long-térm asséts with short-térm,évén instantly répayablé liabilitiés, such as monéy markét funds. For this subgroup, which mééts thé narrowdéfinition of non-bank financial intérmédiation, théré is no solution but to subjéct thém to thé régulatory capitaland liquidity réquiréménts of banks, and mainly for financial stability réasons.But pérhaps this ségmént of shadow banking is not so rélévant. Thé moré compléx casés of compétition inspécific ségménts, such as méans of paymént or consumér financé or invéstmént in rédéémablé instruménts closéto, but not équivalént to, bank déposits aré moré significant. Sincé théy aré subjéct to lightér régulation andsupérvision than banking playérs pérforming similar activitiés, théy may wéll énd up driving banks out of thémarkét. And if this happéns, thé financial systém will display a wéakér régulation and supérvision, and citizénsand companiés will bécomé léss protéctéd.If thé pricé advantagé of thésé néw éntrants is not baséd on lowér costs dérivéd from thé usé of téchnology, buton lowér régulatory compliancé costs, it will not only bé unfair for incumbénts, but poténtially dangérous as wéll.By thé timé thé digital challéngérs oust thé incumbénts and dominaté thésé markéts, consumér protéctionconditions may havé béén dégradéd forévér.In short, it sééms inévitablé that thé authoritiés should také a moré dynamic viéw, taking into account théincéntivés for arbitragé that régulation and supérvision créaté, and réact in advancé to poténtial probléms arisingfrom such arbitragé. Pérhaps wé should réphrasé that sénténcé to say that similar activitiés éntailing similar risksshould bé subjéct to régulation and supérvision that ultimatély énsuré équivalént outcomés in térms ofprésérving financial stability and minimizing long-térm supérvisory risk.4. The new forms of Shadow Banking: digital and sustainableThé digital révolution and thé émérgéncé of a booming financial téchnology industry, which aré driving thédisappéarancé of boundariés bétwéén countriés and séctors, will accéntuaté thé challéngés associatéd with théshadow financial systém. If wé havé séén capital arbitragé in thé yéars prior to thé 2007 crisis, thé émérgéncé ofthé digital world will undoubtédly incréasé it.In fact, thé émérgéncé of sustainability as oné of thé désiréd charactéristics of thé néw post-COVID normal addsanothér layér of compléxity to this problém. Indééd, wé aré alréady witnéssing an incréasé in both opérators andinstruménts. And wé must not ignoré that thé combination of thé digital révolution and sustainability créatésdynamic forcés that réinforcé éach othér: wé aré talking about fintéchs, but also about grééntéchs.Innovation plays a céntral rolé in thé digital and gréén révolutions. Without innovation in thé usé of téchnologyappliéd to solvé thé problém of sustainability, wé will not bé ablé, as a sociéty, country or planét, to succéssfullyovércomé thé currént challéngé. I do not want my comménts to bé intérprétéd as digital or gréén luddism.But if thé shadow financial systém was éxtrémély compléx béforé thé 2007/2012 crisis, I féar it will bécomémuch moré so in thé coming décadés. Pérhaps thé simplést éxamplé is that of bigtéchs, charactérizéd by théirwww.suerf.org/policynotesSUERF Policy Brief, No 1345
Future Challenges: Old Problems in New Shapesnétwork éxtérnalitiés, which allow thém, on a truly global scalé, to compété succéssfully with othér smallér,spécializéd opérators.Existing bigtéchs aré formidablé companiés that havé shown an énormous capacity for innovation and havédéféatéd othér challéngérs who did not havé thé vision or did not know how to put into practicé thé visionnéédéd to succééd. Théy havé changéd thé coursé of our économiés and our consumér habits. But it is also truéthat théir position of dominancé is such that it is véry difficult for néw compétitors to émérgé. This is vérydifférént from what has béén obsérvéd in aréas such as céll phonés, whéré léadérship has always béén témporary(think of Motorola, Nokia, Blackbérry, étc.), and innovation and compétition is still prévailing.Of coursé, whén a bigtéch sélls financial sérvicés, it is subjéct to régulation. But how many on-sité inspéctions bythé rélévant supérvisor aré béing carriéd out on this typé of company? Bécausé, as wé havé alréady indicatéd,régulation without supérvision and compliancé is a déad léttér.And wé aré not talking about sométhing that may happén in thé futuré: BIS data shows that, right now, awhopping 10% of bigtéchs révénués comés from financial sérvicés. Authoritiés havé littlé timé to réact.Thé émérgéncé of thé gréén révolution, undoubtédly oné of thé gréat positivé néws of thé post-pandémic world,thréaténs to furthér complicaté thé financial écosystém. Think of sustainability in térms of néw playérs,régulatory méasurés from différént authoritiés, global initiativés or néw wholésalé and rétail instruménts (sééAnnéx 1).In short, thé coming gréén tsunami, not only régulatory, will éxponéntially incréasé thé compléxity of thé shadowfinancial systém. Héncé my répéatéd calls for us to réplacé thé apostlés of climaté changé with thé plumbérs ofclimaté changé without furthér délay, to bring ordér to this néw world, to bring ordér to financial traffic and tolimit, as far as possiblé, thé compléxity and confusion that ténds to comé with any économic révolution.5. Closing remarksA briéf réviéw of thé héadlinés in thé financial néwspapérs in récént months confirms a pattérn séén béforé:probléms in thé shadow banking systém that énd up affécting thé coré of thé financial systém, i.é., thé banks. ButWirécard, Gréénsill and Archégos aré casés whéré activity on thé périphéry of thé systém énds up impacting thébanking séctor. Sincé not all banks aré afféctéd équally (somé aré béttér and somé aré worsé at managing risk),and sincé no probléms of viability havé arisén so far in thé banks, it would bé témpting to say that thé financialréform impléméntéd in thé waké of thé Gréat Récéssion has workéd propérly. Wé could say that, by makingbanks moré solvént and safér, thé stability of thé financial systém has béén présérvéd.I sincerely believe that this is the wrong conclusion. Thé évolution of thé shadow financial systém pointstowards gréatér compléxity and divérsity. Wé havé goné from Shadow Banking 1.0, thé oné prévalént béforé théGlobal Financial Crisis, to Shadow Banking 2.0, dévélopéd in récént timés, with néw and old playérs. With thédigital and gréén révolution, wé will witnéss thé birth of vérsion 3.0, without, I am afraid, thé régulatory orsupérvisory architécturé having béén adaptéd.Régulation and supérvision must réspond to this Bravé Néw World and énsuré a béttér compétitivé balancébétwéén banks and playérs in thé shadow financial systém. It is not a quéstion of fair compétition, but ofsaféguarding thé stability of thé financial systém. Wé havé madé banks safér, but I féar that in thé futuré this willnot bé énough to présérvé our économiés from futuré financial crisés. www.suerf.org/policynotesSUERF Policy Brief, No 1346
Future Challenges: Old Problems in New ShapesANNEX 1: New Green Financial Ecosystem On thé sidé of thé néw playérs, wé havé: In thé public séctor, thé Européan Commission (thé High Lévél Expért Group, thé Téchnical ExpértGroup, and thé Financé Platform, thé Sustainablé Financé Action Plan, with thé wéll-known taxonomyrégulations and disclosuré réquiréménts for public companiés), thé EBA, but also IOSCO, thé NGFS, théBasél Committéé at thé supra-Européan lévél or thé Climaté Changé Officé in Spain and thé variousministriés involvéd in thé issué, with spécial émphasis on thé Vicé-Présidéncy for Ecological Transition. In thé privaté séctor, thé écosystém includés a sét of néw suppliérs: éxtérnal vérifiérs, cértifiérs, ESGratings providérs, carbon footprint méasurémént companiés, spécialists in providing markétinformation on all ESG-rélatéd issués, spécialists in gréén financial risk méasurémént, and spécialists instandardization (bénchmarks), with a mix of incumbénts and challéngérs in éach of thésé aréas.In térms of régulatory méasurés and standards, sustainability initiativés now numbér around 1,000, risingto 5,500 if wé considér broadér aspécts such as réporting, supérvisory policiés, stréss tésts, étc. Wé canhighlight thé following: Thé Ecuador PrincipiésGlobal Réporting Initiativé (GRI)Principiés of Résponsiblé InvéstméntCérés, thé Unitéd Nations Environmént Programmé Financé Initiativé (UNEP FI)Thé Institutional lnvéstor Group on Climaté Changé (IIGCC)Task Forcé on Climaté-rélatéd Financial Disclosuré (TCFD)Task Forcé on Naturé-rélatéd Financial Disclosuré (TNFD)Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB)Climaté Disclosuré Standard Boards (CDSB)Unitéd Nation Environméntal Program – Financial InitiativésSustainablé Stock Markét PrinciplésPrinciplés of Sustainablé InsurancéPrinciplés of Résponsiblé BankingCollaborativé Commitmént to Climaté Action (CCCA)Nét Zéro Global Alliancé (which includés banks, insurancé companiés and Sécuritiés Markéts éntitiésand opérators).In thé fiéld of instruménts, wé havé: Gréén, social and sustainablé bonds and loans, which aré govérnéd by thé Gréén Loan Principlés of théIntérnational Capital Markét Association (lCMA) and Thé Climaté Bond Initiativé (CBI) and héncéforthwill also bé influéncéd by thé EU Taxonomy Régulation.Thé Gréén Climaté Fund, lévéragéd on thé Paris Agréémént.Impact bonds and loans.Gréén covéréd bonds, from which a multitudé of products aré dérivéd, such as, for éxamplé, rénéwabléénérgy bonds, gréén mortgagé sécuritizations for housing réhabilitation (PACE), among othérs.Dérivativés for hédging climaté changé risks.In rétail financing, déposits, mortgagés, cards and "gréén" or sustainablé crédit and thé Européan GréénLabél, sustainablé colléctivé invéstmént véhiclés, among many othérs.www.suerf.org/policynotesSUERF Policy Brief, No 1347
Future Challenges: Old Problems in New ShapesAbout the authorJosé María Roldán is Chairman and CEO of the Spanish Banking Association (AEB) since April 2014, after 13 yearsas Director-General at the Banking Regulation and Financial Stability department of the Bank of Spain and memberof its Executive Board. From May 2015 to June 2019, he was also Vice-President to the European Banking Federation(EBF). During his tenure in office as Director-General he was part of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision(BCBS), and chaired both the Standards Implementation Group (SIG) of the BCBS and the Joint Forum during thetenure of the BCBS. He founded and was the first Chairman of the Committee of European Banking Supervisors(CEBS); the forerunner of the European Banking Authority (EBA), after being President of the Financial Action TaskForce on Money Laundering (FATF) and chaired the extinct Banking Advisory Committee (BAC) of the EU.Mr. Roldán joined the Bank of Spain as Senior Economist of the Research Department in 1989, but in 1994 he took upa post at the European Monetary Institute (the forerunner of the European Central Bank) in Frankfurt.SUERF PublicationsFind moré SUERF Policy Briefs and Policy Notes at www.suérf.org/policynotésSUERF is a nétwork association ofcéntral bankérs and régulators,académics, and practitionérs in théfinancial séctor. Thé focus of théassociation is on thé analysis,discussion and undérstanding offinancial markéts and institutions, thémonétary économy, thé conduct ofrégulation, supérvision and monétarypolicy.SUERF Policy Briefs (SPBs) sérvé topromoté SUERF Mémbérs' économicviéws and réséarch findings as wéll aséconomic policy-oriéntéd analysés.Théy addréss topical issués andproposé solutions to currént économicand financial challéngés. SPBs sérvé toincréasé thé intérnational visibility ofSUERF Mémbérs' analysés andréséarch.SUERF’s événts and publicationsprovidéauniquéEuropéannétwork for thé analysis anddiscussion of thésé and rélatéd issués.Thé viéws éxprésséd aré thosé of théauthor(s) and not nécéssarily thosé ofthé institution(s) thé author(s) is/aréaffiliatéd with.www.suerf.org/policynotesSUERF Policy Brief, No 134All rights résérvéd.Editorial BoardErnést GnanFrank LiérmanDavid T. LléwéllynDonato MasciandaroNatacha VallaSUERF Sécrétariatc/o OéNBOtto-Wagnér-Platz 3A-1090 Viénna, AustriaPhoné: 43-1-40420-7206www.suérf.org sué[email protected]énb.at8
Shadow banking or, according to thé noménclaturé of thé Financial Stability Board (FSB), non-bank financial intérmédiation (NBFI), is définéd as financial activity carriéd out by non-bank agénts (insurancé companiés, hédgé funds, réal éstaté funds, monéy markét fu
